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Being a better Netizen: MANRS @ DO

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
DO O Developers

MISSION->


Simplify cloud computing so developers and businesses can spend more time creating software that changes the world

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
We offer the world's simplest & most powerful laaS experience



With emerging PaaS that do not require "DevOps" experience



Across 14 data centers in 8 global markets



Why become MANRS Compliant? Our community is bigger than us.

- A Core Value at DigitalOcean

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MANRS Cloud & CDN Program



Action 1:

Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information.

"... Whenever feasible, participants should check that the announcements originate from legitimate holders."



Action 2:

Prevent traffic with illegitimate source IP addresses

"Implement anti-spoofing controls to prevent packets with illegitimate source IP address from leaving the network."



Action 3:

Facilitate global operational communication and coordination

"Maintain globally accessible up-to-date contact information in PeeringDB and relevant RIR databases."

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Ref: https://www.manrs.org/cdn-cloud-providers/

MANRS Cloud & CDN Program



Action 4:

Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale

"... routing information needs to be properly registered in public routing repositories... The two main types of repositories are IRRs and RPKI."



Action 5:

Encourage MANRS adoption

"A publicly available policy, a peering form or an email template with a recommendation to implement MANRS."

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Ref: https://www.manrs.org/cdn-cloud-providers/




Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information.

Challenges


DigitalOcean runs a medium-large global network that peers with hundreds of ASNs on many of the biggest peering fabrics in the world.

Analysis and automation is required to find a workable solution that provides appropriate knobs to control for our scale.



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Analysis






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Analysis



100% coverage would result in ~6.5M LoC on some routers.


2M LoC ~ 95 sec


apply times.

Picked a sensible point to maximise coverage within limitations.

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The heavy lift...





The outcome...

| neighbor 192.0.2.1 { description "Example Network Name"; | |
|---|--------------|
| import [SCRUB-IMPORT-IPv4 IX-IMPORT ABCIX-BILAT-IMPORT-IPv4 AS65535-IX-II family inet { | MPORT-IPv4]; |
| unicast { | |
| prefix-limit { | |
| maximum 600; | |
| teardown { idle-timeout 15; | |
| > } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| export ABC-PEER-EXPORT; | |
| peer-as 65535; | |
| } | |
| | |

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Policy per peer



Chained with other policies, optional completion early.



Easy to read and understand.

The outcome...

traphael@sg-sin01-edge1> show configuration policy-options policy-statement AS65535-IX-IMPORT-IPv4 term RPKI-VALID { from { protocol bgp; community DO-RPKI-VALID; } then accept; } term AS65535 { from { protocol bgp; } then { community add DO-IRR-VALID; accept; } } term DEFAULT { then { community add DO-IRR-INVALID; reject; } }

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Filter on RPKI first



Filter by IRR second



Tag with useful communities as you go.

A quick shout out: Mircea Ulinic

- Network Development Lead @ DigitalOcean
- Core maintainer for NAPALM
- Contributor to SaltStack (2017 Contributor of the year)




Prevent traffic with illegitimate source IP addresses

Action 2: Anti-Spoofing

We already prevent spoofing!

Given DigitalOcean runs such a huge number of workloads, bad actors and spoofed traffic isn't a new challenge. We already have several layers of protection to ensure that all traffic originating from DO is from legitimate sources.



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Action 2: Anti-Spoofing

To be sure?

It's best practice to ensure that our mechanisms to prevent spoofing are actually working. When they aren't, we want to have a clear signal when they no longer are.

The CAIDA Spoofer project to the rescue! We run spoofer nodes in each of our DCs that attempt to send spoofed traffic to the public CAIDA endpoint. A prometheus exporter regularly queries the public CAIDA API and will alert us if spoofed traffic is received.



Prometheus Exporter



Sensible alerting rules with a playbook

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Ref: https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/

Action 2: Anti-Spoofing

To be sure?

alerts:

alert: CAIDA Session Received expr: caida_spoofer_session == 1 labels: service: CAIDA severity: warning instance: "caida-spoofer::{{\$labels.session}}" team: infra-network environment: IEB annotations: description: "CAIDA Spoofer session received" URL: Session {{\$labels.session}} Report playbook: CAIDA Spoofers

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Ref: https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/



CAIDA Spoofer Project



Prometheus Exporter



Sensible alerting rules with a playbook




Facilitate global operational communication and coordination

Action 3: Coordination

How to find us...

We keep our WHOIS data up-to-date as we on-board new IP space through a regularly used playbook. This ensures all the same data is present on all our prefixes:

→ ~ whois `host dodroplet.com | awk '{print \$4}'` | grep Email OrgTechEmail: noc@digitalocean.com OrgNOCEmail: noc@digitalocean.com OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@digitalocean.com



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Action 3: Coordination

How to find us...

Because we rely on our peering partners to keep their PeeringDB record up-to-date for automation reasons, we should set the best example and do so as well.

| DigitalOcean | | Peering Policy Information | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|--|
| | | Peering Policy | https://www.a | https://www.as14061.net/ | |
| Organization | DigitalOcean | General Policy | Selective | | |
| Also Known As | Digital Ocean | Multiple Locations | Not Required | | |
| Long Name | | Ratio Requiremen | t No | | |
| Company Website | https://www.digitalocean.com | Contract Requiren | nent Not Required | | |
| ASN | 14061 | | - 41 | | |
| IRR as-set/route-set 9 | AS-14061 | Contact Information | | | |
| | | Role 1 | Name | Phone 🕄 E-Mail | |
| | | Abuse | Abuse | abuse@digitalocean.com | |

NOC

Policy

Network Operations

Peering

noc@digitalocean.com

peering@digitalocean.com



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


Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale

Action 4: Global Validation

We publish our routing data!

Given we allocate prefixes on a per-region basis, we need to ensure that the correct prefix lengths are kept up-to-date in our IRR objects. We use a scheduled "cron" job deployed to our internal application stack to ensure our IRR objects are accurate.



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Action 4: Global Validation

We publish our routing data!

We use covering ROAs with max-prefix-length populated to ensure we have valid ROAs for the prefixes we intend to advertise.

| Routing completeness (IRR) | | Routing completeness (RPKI) | | | |
|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|---------|------------------|-------|
| Unregistered | 0 | 0.0% | Valid | 724 | 98.5% |
| Registered | 735 | 100.0% | Unknown | 11 | 1.5% |
| | | | Invalid | 0 | 0.0% |
| | | | | | |
| Unregistered | Registered | | Valid U | nknown 📕 Invalid | |
| | | | | | |



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
Action 4: Global Validation

We publish our routing data!

Netbox reports are used to check for compliance and give us strong alerting signals when things aren't correct.

| Report Results | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------|---------------|--|-------------|
| Time | Level | Object | Message | |
| test_announce_roa | | | | |
| 2022-02- 20T14:42:19.708340+00:00 | Failure | 69.55.48.0/24 | ROA state for this prefix is not-found: No VRP Covers the Ro | oute Prefix |
| <pre>test_aggregates_radb</pre> | | | | |
| 2022-02- 20T14:42:00.073470+00:00 | Info | | Received 854 route objects from RADb | |
| 2022-02- 20T14:42:00.155129+00:00 | Success | l | all DigitalOcean aggregates have RADb objects | |

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Action 5: Encourage Adoption

Action 5: Encourage Adoption

Simple as...

"...Peers are encouraged to implement Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) - https://www.manrs.org."

https://as14061.net/

DigitalOcean Network Operations PeeringDB

Peering Policy

Summary

This document describes the peering policies for DigitalOcean (AS14061)

Background

An Internet Exchange (IX) is a location where ISPs and network operators come together to peer directly or indirectly. Most often these peerings are settlement-free. Peering enables us to provide better experience for customers by interfacing with the networks directly rather than via transit paths. Contacts

Abuse

Report Abuse—Reports of abusive activity originating from AS14061 (spam, DDoS, copyright violations, etc.)

Customer Support Contact Support—If you are a DigitalOcean customer, use this. Peering

peering@digitalocean.com—Requests for new peering sessions or changes to existing sessions.

noc@digitalocean.com-All other routing/network related issues.



Updated our peering policy.

Encouraged adoption of MANRS.



Provided relevant links.

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


Compliance

December 2020

DigitalOcean Joins MANRS Initiative to Combat Routing Security Threats


Posted 2020-12-17 in news






Today we are pleased to announce that DigitalOcean has joined the <u>Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security</u> (<u>MANRS</u>) initiative for CDN and Cloud Providers to reduce common routing security threats. The initiative, supported by the Internet Society, outlines actions network operators should take to improve the resilience and security of routing infrastructure.







What next?

Action 6: Monitoring and debugging

Visibility is everything...

To help our peers we intend to launch an externally-facing looking glass that can help debug routing issues. To fit in with our other MANRS obligations we should ensure that RPKI status, route filtering status and various other aspects of routing policy are made clear with this tool.

Public Looking glass Route filtering state **Route distribution** policy

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Improvement never ends...

While most of our processes are automated, there is always those few that aren't - we're continually aiming to improve automation coverage where it makes sense.

With the onset of a global network overhaul, new equipment gives us new capability to improve our filtering coverage.

Lastly, alerting and subsequent actions can always be improved as we experience new challenges and failure modes to learn from. **Increase automation** coverage Increase prefix-list coverage Improve alerting

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Thank you



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