



Australian Government

Department of Defence

Defence Science and Technology Group

# OSPF Cryptographic Authentication

Chris Wiren, Engineer

Communication Networks Research Group

Defence Science Technology Group

Email: [chris.wiren@dsto.defence.gov.au](mailto:chris.wiren@dsto.defence.gov.au)

Office: +61 8 7389 6572 Mobile: 0421 708 753

**DST**  
GROUP

Science and Technology for Safeguarding Australia

# OSPF Cryptographic Authentication

Hashing Function



+


Key Id

+

Sequence Number



RFC 2328 Appendix D



**HMAC**  
Hashed Message  
Authentication Code



OSPF

+



Shared Secret



*“A simple risk analysis would suggest that an ideal attack target of minimal cost but maximal disruption is the core routing infrastructure.”*  
RFC4948 – August **2007**

Confidentiality ✗  
Integrity ✓  
Availability ✓



# OSPF Cryptographic Authentication

## OSPF MD5 Key Recommendation

Character Set	Length
Alphabetic	14
Alphanumeric	14
Printable	13
Binary	10

*“It is a common misconception that because OSPFv2 specifies MD5 as the hashing function, it is fundamentally insecure.”*

## Why?

It's a HMAC, the *input* changes

Only 470,000 words and Computers are *fast*

## Shared Secret Complexity is Important

Complex with sufficient length

1 Year

Dictionary word

1 Second

Chris Wiren, Engineer  
Communication Networks Research Group  
[chris.wiren@dsto.defence.gov.au](mailto:chris.wiren@dsto.defence.gov.au)  
Office: +61 8 7389 6572      Mobile: 0421 708 753

Witty, B, Wiren, C., Nagy, S. 'Cryptographic Security of Pre-Shared Keys in OSPFv2', DSTO-TR-0508