

Scaling Broadband Networks

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iiNet

- Network scalability in a broadband subscriber environment

- Real world

Challenges

Solutions

- Every SP has specific constraints

∴ YMMV

- Problem ? Where ?
- Solution to scaling networks is easy.....
- Simply throw more resources at it




- However, must consider...
 - Real-world constraints
 - Factors outside of our control
 - Commercial Reality™



- Definition of “scale” in an iiNet context



> 230k BB users



>15 Gbps IP

- Scalability in the context of.....
 - **Authentication**
 - Address Allocation
 - Accounting
 - Bandwidth

- Requirements and constraints
 - Authenticate all BB users in a State within 5 minutes
 - 75,000 users in a PoP → 250 sessions/sec
 - Maintain RADIUS technology
 - No manual intervention



- Several optimisations required to achieve customer authentication goal
 - Reduce belligerent auth requests
 - RADIUS transaction efficiency
 - Extended radius source ports
 - Local address assignment

Reduction of belligerent authentication requests

- Around 200K nonsensical access-rejects per day
- Deployment of PPP connection throttling
 - Acts as DoS protection
 - e.g. after 3 failed authentication requests in 60 seconds, BRAS ignores that user for 5 minutes
- Future implementations will eliminate this issue altogether – 2 stage approach


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Radius transaction efficiency

- Originally there was a significant quantity of per-user information being sent in authorisation transaction
 - QoS policies – many flavours
 - Filters – standard bogon + user-selectable
- Aim to reduce quantity of information sent from RADIUS to BRAS by using locally defined policies.

Authentication

RADIUS




Only filter names are defined on radius



joe user: ip:inacl = "Filter#1"
bob user: ip:inacl = "Filter#2"


BRAS




ACLs defined on BRAS

```
ip access-list extended BogonFilterIn
remark *** Deny Bogons ***
deny ip 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 169.254.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any
deny ip 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 any
deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
deny ip 224.0.0.0 31.255.255.255 any
deny ip any 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
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permit ip any any
```

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
- Several optimisations required to achieve customer authentication goal
 - ✓ Reduce belligerent auth requests
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 - Extended radius source ports
 - Local address assignment

Extended radius source ports

- By default, a single source port (1645) is used by the BRAS for all authentication requests
- Max 256 access requests can be outstanding at any one time

```
AUTH: Duplicate authentication request id=12 already in progress
CHAP: I RESPONSE id 12 len 28 from "joeuser"
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AUTH: Duplicate authentication request id=12 already in progress
```

- Use extended radius source ports 21645-21844
- BRAS cycles sequentially through source ports




- Now have 200×256 authentication requests in progress

- Several optimisations required to achieve customer authentication goal
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
Local Address Assignment

- Originally all IP addresses were assigned from a centralised database
 - Simple capacity management
 - Efficient use of address space
 - Operational consistency

- Retrieving the IP address from the database was the performance bottleneck




- Solution: Local IP pools → authentication <20ms




- Goal of authenticating all users in 5 minutes achieved
 - ✓ Reduce belligerent auth requests
 - ✓ RADIUS transaction efficiency
 - ✓ Extended radius source ports
 - ✓ Local address assignment

- Scalability in the context of.....
 - Authentication
 - **Address Allocation**
 - Accounting
 - Bandwidth


- Originally, centralised allocation paradigm very efficient




- Requirements unchanged in BRAS failure scenario




- Move to local address assignment for performance



- Address shortage under failure scenario




- “Easy” solution – overprovision IP addresses




Address Allocation


- No issues in failure scenario w/ address over provisioning



- Currently trialling on-demand address pools




- Efficiency of centralised management with performance of local assignment



- Scalability in the context of.....
 - Authentication
 - Address Allocation
 - **Accounting**
 - Bandwidth

- Business requirements for user traffic accounting are complex
- Traditional RADIUS, SNMP do not easily satisfy these requirements
- Important to business strategy




- Traditional approach was to use Netflow accounting at the network border
- With increased DSL2+ subscribers, started to see more of this:

```
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 95%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 99%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 99%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 96%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 99%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 97%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 98%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 99%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 95%
%EARL-SP-4-NF_USAGE: Current Netflow Table Utilization is 99%
```


- Investigated sampled Netflow...
 - Accurate for long-lived flows at high bit rates
 - Residential user traffic was mainly bursty and short-lived
 - Deemed not suitable for our accounting requirements
 - Still lives in the network used for traffic analysis.

- Migrated from centralised to distributed Netflow model



- Solved issue of losing Netflow accounting data, but introduced scaling issues with backend processing

- Have now deployed Differentiated Radius Accounting
- Combines scalability of traditional radius with flexibility of multiple accounting buckets



- Differentiated RADIUS Accounting
 - Scalable – amount of accounting data does not increase as user traffic increases
 - Reduced backend system requirements
 - Accounting data visible within 15 minutes
 - Linear capacity planning - deterministic


- Scalability in the context of.....
 - Authentication
 - Address Allocation
 - Accounting
 - **Bandwidth**

- Bandwidth is one of the largest cost elements of any SP network
- 2 approaches
 - Source additional capacity
 - Use what you have more efficiently
- 2 key elements to bandwidth efficiency
 - Traffic Engineering
 - Differentiated Services


- Key deliverable
 - Traffic is always evenly balanced over transmission links
 - Network utilisation is unaffected by external topology changes

- Solution
 - MPLS Traffic Engineering
 - Leverage existing MPLS deployment in backbone


Scaling Bandwidth - TE




Scaling Bandwidth - TE




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


- Additional advantages
 - Unequal cost load sharing over multiple paths gives business flexibility
 - Fast failure recovery
- Tradeoffs
 - 50% of traffic needs to be carried by cross-town link
 - But.....plenty of capacity (30Gbps+), fibre is inexpensive

- Approach to network scalability is primarily a function of deliverables vs. constraints

- Some valuable lessons learned for successful scaling
 - Network needs to be deterministic

 - Use systems that scale linearly



Thankyou